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ABSTRACT
Modern data stores achieve scalability by partitioning data into
shards and fault-tolerance by replicating each shard across several
servers. A key component of such systems is a Transaction Cer-
tification Service (TCS), which atomically commits a transaction
spanning multiple shards. Existing TCS protocols require 2f + 1
crash-stop replicas per shard to tolerate f failures. In this paper we
present atomic commit protocols that require only f + 1 replicas
and reconfigure the system upon failures using an external re-
configuration service. We furthermore rigorously prove that these
protocols correctly implement a recently proposed TCS specifica-
tion. We present protocols in two different models—the standard
asynchronous message-passing model and a model with Remote
Direct Memory Access (RDMA), which allows a machine to access
the memory of another machine over the network without involv-
ing the latter’s CPU. Our protocols are inspired by a recent FARM
system for RDMA-based transaction processing. Our work codifies
the core ideas of FARM as distributed TCS protocols, rigorously
proves them correct and highlights the trade-offs required by the
use of RDMA.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern data stores are often required to manage massive amounts
of data while providing stringent transactional guarantees to their
users. They achieve scalability by partitioning data into indepen-
dently managed shards (aka partitions) and fault-tolerance by repli-
cating each shard across a set of servers [6, 10, 22]. Such data stores
often use optimistic concurrency control [26], where a transac-
tion is first executed speculatively, and the results (e.g., read and
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write sets) are then certified to determine whether the transaction
can commit or must abort because of a conflict with concurrent
transactions. The certification is implemented by a Transaction Cer-
tification Service (TCS), which accepts a stream of transactions and
outputs decisions based on a given certification function, defining
the concurrency-control check for the desired isolation level. TCS
is the most challenging part of transaction processing in systems
with the above architecture, since it requires solving a distributed
agreement problem among the replicated shards participating in
the transaction. This agreement problem has been recently formal-
ized as the multi-shot commit problem [5], generalizing the classical
atomic commit problem [9] to more faithfully reflect the require-
ments of modern transaction processing systems (we review the
new problem statement in §2).
Most existing solutions to the TCS problem require replicating
each shard among 2f + 1 replicas to tolerate f crash-stop failures
within each shard [6, 10, 15, 27], which allows using a replication
protocol such as Paxos [16]. This is expensive: if transaction data are
written to all replicas of the shard, only f +1 replicas are needed for
the data to survive failures. Since, in this case even a single replica
failure will block transaction processing, to recover we need to
reconfigure the system, i.e., change its membership to replace failed
replicas with fresh ones. Unfortunately, processes concurrently
deciding to reconfigure the system need to be able to agree on
the next configuration; this reduces to solving consensus, which
again requires 2f + 1 replicas [17]. The way out of this conundrum
is to use a separate configuration service with 2f + 1 replicas to
perform consensus on the configuration. In this way, we use 2f + 1
replicas only to store the small amount of information about the
configuration and f +1 replicas to store the actual data. This vertical
approach [18], which layers replication on top of a configuration
service, has been used by a number of practical systems [1, 4, 8].
It is particularly suitable for deployment in local-area networks,
where the configuration service can be reached quickly.
In this paper we propose the first rigorously proven protocols
for implementing a TCS in a vertical system, with f + 1 replicas
per shard and an external configuration service. We present proto-
cols in two different models—the standard asynchronous message-
passing model (§3) and a model with Remote Direct Memory Access
(RDMA), which allows a machine to access the memory of another
machine over the network without involving the latter’s CPU (§5).
Our protocols are parametric in the isolation level provided, and
we prove that they correctly implement the TCS specification from
the multi-shot commit problem [5] (§4).
Our work complements and takes its inspiration from a recent
FARM system [8, 23]—a transaction processing system that achieves
impressive scalability and availability by exploiting RDMA and
the vertical approach. FARM currently forms the core of a graph
database used to serve some of search queries in Microsoft Bing. It
is a complex system that includes a number of optimizations, both
specific to RDMA and not. FARM’s design was presented without a
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rigorous proof of correctness, and it did not highlight which features
are motivated by the use of RDMA and which are inherent to the
vertical approach. Our work provides a theoretical complement to
FARM: we codify its core ideas as distributed transaction commit
protocols and rigorously prove them correct with respect to the
TCS specification. By basing our protocols on a principled footing,
we are also able to provide better fault-tolerance guarantees than
FARM. Finally, by presenting two related protocols using message
passing and RDMA, we determine the trade-offs required by the
use of RDMA.
In more detail, a straightforward way to implement TCS is using
the classical two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [11]. Since 2PC is not
fault-tolerant, we can make each shard simulate a reliable process
in 2PC using a replication protocol such as Paxos [6, 10]. This
vanilla approach requires every 2PC action to be replicated using
Paxos, which results in a high latency (7 message delays to learn a
decision on a transaction [21]) and a high load on Paxos leaders. To
improve on this, our protocol combines 2PC and Vertical Paxos [18]
into one coherent protocol, thereby minimizing the latency and
load on Paxos leaders. Upon a failure inside a shard, we use the
reconfiguration service to replace the failed replicas, as in Vertical
Paxos. This reconfiguration interacts nontrivially with the 2PC part
of the protocol: e.g., reconfiguration may lead to losing undecided
transactions that affected 2PC computations of decisions on other
transactions—a behavior that we nevertheless show to be correct.
Finally, we show that the price of exploiting RDMA to efficiently
write transaction data to replicas is that reconfiguration has to
be performed globally, instead of per-shard: when reconfiguring
a shard, we have to ensure that the whole system is aware of the
configuration before activating it.
2 TRANSACTION CERTIFICATION SERVICE
Service interface and certification functions. A Transaction
Certification Service (TCS) is meant to be used in the context of
transactional processing systems with optimistic concurrency con-
trol [26], where transactions are first executed speculatively, and
the results are submitted for certification to the TCS. We start by
reviewing its specification proposed in [5]. Clients invoke the TCS
using requests of the form certify(t , l), where t ∈ T is a unique
transaction identifier and l ∈ L is the transaction payload, which
carries the results of the optimistic execution of the transaction
(e.g., read and write sets). Responses of the service are of the form
decide(t ,d), where d ∈ D = {abort, commit}. A TCS is specified
using a certification function f : 2L × L → D, which encapsulates
the concurrency-control policy for the desired isolation level. The
result f (L, l) is the decision for the transaction with payload l given
the set of payloads L of the previously committed transactions. We
require f to be distributive in the following sense:
∀L1, L2, l. f (L1 ∪ L2, l) = f (L1, l) ⊓ f (L2, l), (1)
where ⊓ is such that commit⊓commit = commit and d⊓abort =
abort for any d . This requirement is justified by the fact that
common definitions of f (L, l) check l for conflicts against each
transaction in L separately.
As an example, consider a transactional system managing objects
from Obj with values from Val, where transactions can execute
reads and writes on the objects. The objects are associated with
a totally ordered set Ver of versions. Then the payload of a trans-
action t is a triple ⟨R,W ,Vc ⟩. Here the read set R ⊆ Obj × Ver is
the set of objects with their versions that t read, which contains
one version per object. The write setW ⊆ Obj × Val is the set of
objects with their values that t wrote, which contains one value
per object. We require that any object written has also been read:
∀(x , _) ∈W . (x , _) ∈ R. Finally, the commit version Vc ∈ Ver is the
version to be assigned to the writes of t . We require this version to
be higher than any of the versions read: ∀(_,v) ∈ R.Vc > v . Given
this domain of transactions, the following certification function
encapsulates the classical concurrency-control policy for serializ-
ability [26]: f (L, ⟨R,W ,Vc ⟩) = commit iff none of the versions in
R have been overwritten by a transaction in L, i.e.,
∀x ,v . (x ,v) ∈ R =⇒
(∀(_,W ′,V ′c ) ∈ L. (x , _) ∈W ′ =⇒ V ′c ≤ v). (2)
TCS specification. We represent TCS executions using histories—
sequences of certify and decide actions such that every trans-
action appears at most once in certify, and each decide is a
response to exactly one preceding certify. For a history h we let
act(h) be the set of actions in h. For actions a,a′ ∈ act(h), we write
a ≺h a′ when a occurs before a′ in h. A history h is complete if ev-
ery certify action in it has a matching decide action. A complete
history is sequential if it consists of pairs of certify and matching
decide actions. A transaction t commits in a history h if h contains
decide(t , commit). We denote by committed(h) the projection of h
to actions corresponding to the transactions that are committed in
h. For a complete history h, a linearization ℓ of h [13] is a sequential
history such that h and ℓ contain the same actions and
∀t , t ′. decide(t , _) ≺h certify(t ′, _) =⇒
decide(t , _) ≺ℓ certify(t ′, _).
A complete sequential history h is legal with respect to a certifica-
tion function f , if its decisions are computed according to f :
∀t , l,d . certify(t , l), decide(t ,d) ∈ act(h) =⇒
d = f ({l′ | certify(t ′, l′) ∈ act(h) ∧
decide(t ′, commit) ≺h decide(t ,d)}, l).
A history h is correct with respect to f if h | committed(h) has a
legal linearization. A TCS implementation is correct with respect to
f if so are all its histories.
A TCS implementation satisfying the above specification can be
readily used in a transaction processing system. For example, con-
sider the domain of transactions defined earlier. A typical system
based on optimistic concurrency control will ensure that trans-
actions submitted for certification only read versions written by
previously committed transactions. A history produced by such a
system that is correct with respect to certification function (2) is
also serializable [5]. Hence, a TCS correct with respect to this certi-
fication function can indeed be used to implement serializability.
Shard-local certification functions. We are interested in TCS
implementations in systems where the data are partitioned into
shards from a set S. In such systems TCS is usually implemented
using a variant of the classical two-phase commit protocol (2PC) [11].
In this protocol each shard s receiving a transaction for certification
first prepares it, i.e., performs a local concurrency-control check and
accordingly votes to commit or abort the transaction. The votes
on the transaction by different shards are aggregated, and the final
decision is then distributed to all shards: the transaction can commit
only if all votes are commit. When a shard s votes on a transaction,
it does not have information about all transactions in the system,
but only those that concern it. Hence, the votes are computed using
not the global certification function f , but shard-local certification
functions [5], which check for conflicts only on objects managed by
the shard and correspondingly take as parameters only the parts
of the transaction payloads relevant to the shard: for a payload l
we denote this by l | s . For example, let Objs be the set of objects
managed by a shard s . For a payload l = ⟨R,W ,Vc ⟩ of the form
given above, we let l | s = ⟨Rs ,W s ,Vc ⟩, where Rs = {(x , _) ∈ R |
x ∈ Objs } andW s = {(x , _) ∈ W | x ∈ Objs }. There are two
shard-local functions, fs : 2L × L → D and дs : 2L × L → D.
As its first argument fs takes the set of shard-relevant payloads
of transactions that previously committed at the shard, and дs the
set of such payloads for transactions that have been prepared to
commit. As their second argument, the functions take the part of
the payload of the transaction being certified relevant to the shard.
We require that these functions are distributive, similarly to (1).
For example, the shard-local certification functions for serializ-
ability are defined as follows: fs (L, ⟨R,W ,Vc ⟩) = commit iff
∀x ∈ Objs . ∀v . (x ,v) ∈ R =⇒
(∀⟨_,W ′,V ′c ⟩ ∈ L. (x , _) ∈W ′ =⇒ V ′c ≤ v),
and дs (L, ⟨R,W ,Vc ⟩) = commit iff
∀x ∈ Objs . ∀v . ((x , _) ∈ R =⇒ (∀⟨_,W ′, _⟩ ∈ L. (x , _) <W ′)) ∧
((x , _) ∈W =⇒ (∀⟨R′, _, _⟩ ∈ L. (x , _) < R′)).
The function fs certifies a transaction t against previously com-
mitted transactions similarly to the certification function (2) for
serializability, but taking into account only the objects managed by
the shard s . The function дs certifies t against transactions prepared
to commit, and its check is stricter than that of fs . In our example,
the function дs aborts a transaction t if: (i) it read an object writ-
ten by a transaction t ′ prepared to commit; or (ii) it writes to an
object read by a transaction t ′ prepared to commit. This reflects
the behaviour of typical implementations, which upon preparing a
transaction acquire read locks on its read set and write locks on its
write set, and abort the transaction if the locks cannot be acquired.
For a sharded TCS implementation to be correct, shard-local
functions have to match the global certification function, i.e., per-
form similar conflict checks. We formalize the required conditions
as follows. Assume a function shards : T → 2S that determines
the shards that need to certify a transaction with a given identi-
fier, which are usually the shards storing the data the transaction
accesses. We also assume a distinguished empty payload ε ∈ L
such that ∀s, L. fs (L, ε) = commit. For example, for a payload
l = ⟨R,W , _⟩ of the form given above, l = ε is such that R = ∅
andW = ∅. We require that for a transaction t ∈ T with payload
l ∈ L, for each shard s < shards(t), we have l | s = ε . We fur-
ther lift the | operator to sets of payloads: for any L ⊆ L we let
(L | s) = {(l | s) | l ∈ L}. Then we require that global and local
certification functions match as follows:
∀l ∈ L. ∀L ⊆ L. f (L, l) = commit ⇐⇒
∀s ∈ S. fs ((L | s), (l | s)) = commit. (3)
Finally, for each shard s ∈ S, the two functions fs and дs are
required to be related to each other as follows [5]:
∀l ∈ L. L ⊆ L.дs (L, l) = commit =⇒ fs (L, l) = commit; (4)
∀l, l′ ∈ L.дs ({l}, l′)= commit =⇒ fs ({l′}, l)= commit. (5)
Property (4) requires the conflict check performed by дs to be no
weaker than the one performed by fs . Property (5) requires a form
of commutativity: if a transaction with payload l ′ is allowed to
commit after a still-pending transaction with payload l , then the
latter would be allowed to commit after the former.
3 ATOMIC COMMIT PROTOCOL
System model. We consider an asynchronous message-passing
system consisting of a set of processesP whichmay fail by crashing,
i.e., permanently stopping execution. We assume that processes are
connected by reliable FIFO channels: messages are delivered in FIFO
order, and messages between non-faulty processes are guaranteed
to be eventually delivered. A function client : T → P determines
the client process that issued a given transaction.
Each shard s ∈ S is managed by a group of replica processes,
whose membership can change over time. For simplicity, we as-
sume that the groups of replica processes managing different shards
are disjoint. Each shard moves through a sequence of configura-
tions, determining its membership. Reconfiguration is the process
of changing the configuration of a shard. In our protocols recon-
figuration is initiated by a replica when it suspects another replica
of failing: for simplicity we do not expose it in the TCS interface.
Every member of a shard in a given configuration is either the
leader of the shard or a follower. A configuration of a shard s is then
a tuple ⟨e,M,pl ⟩ where e is the epoch identifying the configuration,
M ∈ 2P is the set of processes that manage s at e, and pl ∈ M is the
leader of s at e.
Configurations are stored in an external configuration service
(CS), which for simplicity we assume to be a reliable process. In
practice, this service may be implemented using Paxos-like repli-
cation over 2f + 1 processes out of which at most f can fail (as
done in systems such as Zookeeper [14]). The configuration service
stores the configurations of all shards and provides three operations.
An operation compare_and_swap(s, e, ⟨e ′,M,pl ⟩) succeeds if the
epoch of the last stored configuration of s is e ; in this case it stores
the provided configuration with a higher epoch e ′ > e . Operations
get_last(s) and get(s, e) respectively return the last configuration
of s and the configuration of s associated with a given epoch e .
Protocol preliminaries. We give the pseudocode of our proto-
col in Figure 1, illustrate its message flow in Figure 2 and summarize
the key invariants used in its proof of correctness in Figure 3. The
protocol weaves together the two-phase commit protocol across
shards [11] and a Vertical Paxos-based reconfiguration protocol
within each shard [18]. At any given time, a process participates in
a single configuration of the shard it belongs to. The process stores
the information about this configuration as well as those of other
shards in several arrays: configuration epochs are stored in an array
epoch ∈ S → N, the current members in members ∈ S → 2P ,
and the current leader in leader ∈ S → P. The entries for the
shard the process belongs to give the configuration the process is
in; the other entries maintain information about the configurations
of the other shards. A status variable at a process records whether
it is a leader, a follower or is in a special reconfiguring state
used during reconfiguration. Each process keeps track of the sta-
tus of transactions in an array phase, whose entries initially store
start. The transaction status changes to preparedwhen the shard
determines its vote and to decided when a final decision on the
transaction is reached.
Failure-free case. A client submits a transaction for certification
by calling the certify function at any replica process, which will
serve as the coordinator of the transaction (line 1). The function
takes as arguments the transaction’s identifier and its payload.
The transaction coordinator first sends a PREPARE message to the
leaders of the relevant shards, which includes the payload part for
each shard (line 3). The leader of a shard arranges all transactions
it receives into a total certification order, which the leader stores
in an array txn ∈ N → T ; a next ∈ Z variable points to the
last filled slot in the array. When the leader receives a PREPARE
message for a transaction for the first time (line 8), it appends
the transaction to the certification order, stores the transaction’s
payload in an array payload ∈ N→ L, and sets the transaction’s
phase to prepared. It then computes a vote on the transaction
and stores it in an array vote ∈ N → {commit,abort} (line 12).
The vote is computed using the shard-local certification functions
fs0 and дs0 to check for conflicts against transactions that have
been previously committed or prepared to commit; the results are
combined using the ⊓ operator, so that the transaction can commit
only if both functions say so. We defer the description of the cases
when the leader has previously received the transaction in the
PREPARE message (line 6) and when the payload in the message is
an undefined value ⊥ (line 14).
Our protocol next replicates the leader’s decision and the trans-
action payload at the followers. Instead of having the leader to
do this directly, the protocol delegates this task to the coordina-
tor of the transaction. This design is used by practical systems,
such as Corfu [1] and FARM [8], since it minimizes the load on
the leaders, which are the main potential performance bottleneck.
Instead, the network-intensive task of persisting transactions at
multiple followers is spread among a number of different transac-
tion coordinators. As we explain in the following, this optimization
interacts in a nontrivial way with transaction certification. In more
detail, after preparing a transaction the leader sends a PREPARE_ACK
message to the coordinator of the transaction, which carries the
leader’s epoch, the transaction identifier, its position in the certi-
fication order, the payload, and the vote (line 20). Upon receiving
the PREPARE_ACK message (line 18), the coordinator forwards the
data from the PREPARE_ACK message to the followers in an ACCEPT
message.
A process handles an ACCEPT message only if it participates in
the corresponding epoch (line 22). The process stores the transac-
tion identifier, its payload and vote, and advances the transaction’s
phase to prepared. It then sends an ACCEPT_ACK message to the
coordinator of the transaction, confirming that the process has
accepted the transaction and the vote. The certification order at a
follower is always a prefix with zero or more holes of the certifica-
tion order at the leader of the epoch the follower is in, as formalized
by Invariant 1 (Figure 3). The holes in the prefix arise from the
lack of FIFO ordering in the communication between the leader
of a given epoch and its followers, as the ACCEPT message for a
given transaction is sent to the followers by the coordinator of the
transaction and not directly by the leader.
The coordinator of a transaction t acts once it receives
ACCEPT_ACK messages for t from every follower of its shards
s ∈ shards(t) (line 26); it determines this using the configuration
information it stores for every shard. The coordinator computes
the final decision on t using the ⊓ operator on the votes of each
involved shard: the transaction can commit if all votes are commit.
The coordinator then sends the final decision in DECISIONmessages
to the client and to each of the relevant shards. When a process
receives a decision for a transaction (line 30), it stores the decision
and advances the transaction’s phase to decided. In a realistic im-
plementation, at this point the process would also upcall into the
transaction processing system running at its server, to inform it
about the decision and allow it to apply the transaction’s writes to
the database if the decision is to commit.
In the absence of failures, our protocol allows the client to learn a
decision on a transaction in 5 message delays, instead of 7 required
by vanilla protocols that use Paxos as a black-box [6, 10]. We can
further reduce this to 4 by co-locating the client with the transaction
coordinator. The protocol also minimizes the load on Paxos leaders,
which are the main potential bottleneck: each involved leader only
has to receive one PREPARE and one DECISION message, and send
one PREPARE_ACK message.
Reconfiguration. When a failure is suspected in a shard s , any
process can initiate a reconfiguration of the shard to replace failed
replicas. Reconfiguration is done only in the affected shard, with-
out disrupting others. It aims to preserve Invariant 2, which is key
in proving the correctness of the protocol. This assumes that all
followers in s at an epoch e have received ACCEPT(e,k, t , l ,d) and
responded to it with ACCEPT_ACK; in this case we say that the trans-
action t has been accepted at shard s . The invariant guarantees that
the accepted transaction t will persist in epochs higher than e; this
is used to prove that the protocol computes a unique decision on
each transaction. The invariant also guarantees that the entries pre-
ceding t in the certification order in epochs higher than e may only
contain the votes that the leader of s at epoch e took into account
when computing the vote d on t (some of these votes may be miss-
ing due to the lack of FIFO order in the communication between the
leader and its followers). This property is necessary to guarantee
that the protocol computes decisions according to a single global
certification order, as required by the TCS specification.
To ensure Invariant 2, a process performing reconfiguration first
probes previous configurations to determine which processes are
still alive and to find a process whose state contains all transac-
tions previously accepted at the shard, which will serve the new
leader. The new leader then transfers its state to the members
of the new configuration, thereby initializing them. A variable
initialized ∈ {true, false} at a process records whether it has
1 function certify(t , l)
2 forall s ∈ shards(t) do
3 send PREPARE(t , (l | s)) to leader[s];
4 when received PREPARE(t , l) from pj
5 pre: status = leader;
6 if ∃k . t = txn[k] then
7 send PREPARE_ACK(epoch[s0], s0,k, txn[k],
payload[k], vote[k]) to pj
8 else
9 next← next + 1;
10 (txn, phase)[next] ← (t , prepared);
11 if l , ⊥ then
12 vote[next] ← fs0 (L1, l) ⊓ дs0 (L2, l);
13 payload[next] ← l;
14 else
15 vote[next] ← abort;
16 payload[next] ← ε ;
17 send PREPARE_ACK(epoch[s0], s0, next, t ,
payload[next], vote[next]) to pj ;
18 when received PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d)
19 pre: epoch[s] = e;
20 send ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) to members[s] \ leader[s];
21 when received ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) from pj
22 pre: status = follower ∧ epoch[s0] = e;
23 if phase[k] = start then
24 (txn, payload, vote, phase)[next] ← (t , l,d, prepared);
25 send ACCEPT_ACK(s0, e,k, t ,d) to pj ;
26 when for every s ∈ shards(t) received an
ACCEPT_ACK(s, epoch[s],ks , t ,ds ) from every
pj ∈ members[s] \ leader[s]
27 send DECISION(t ,ds ∈shards(t ) ds ) to client(t);
28 forall s ∈ shards(t) do
29 send DECISION(epoch[s],ks ,
d
s ∈shards(t ) ds )
to members[s];
30 when received DECISION(e,k,d)
31 pre: status ∈ {leader, follower} ∧ epoch[s0] ≥ e;
32 (dec, phase)[k] ← (d,decided);
33 function reconfigure(s)
34 pre: probing = false;
35 probing← true;
36 ⟨probed_epoch, probed_members, _⟩ ← get_last(s) at CS;
37 recon_epoch← probed_epoch + 1;
38 recon_shard← s;
39 send PROBE(recon_epoch) to probed_members;
40 when received PROBE(e) from pj
41 pre: e ≥ new_epoch;
42 status = reconfiguring;
43 new_epoch← e;
44 send PROBE_ACK(initialized, e, s0) to pj ;
45 when received PROBE_ACK(true, recon_epoch,
recon_shard) from pj
46 pre: probing = true;
47 probing← false;
48 M ← compute_membership();
49 var r ← compare_and_swap(recon_shard,
recon_epoch − 1, ⟨recon_epoch,M,pj ⟩) at CS;
50 if r then send NEW_CONFIG(recon_epoch,M) to pj ;
51 non-deterministically when received
PROBE_ACK(false, recon_epoch, recon_shard) from
pj ∈ probed_members and no
PROBE_ACK(true, recon_epoch, recon_shard)
52 pre: probing = true;
53 probed_epoch← probed_epoch − 1;
54 probed_members← get(recon_shard,
probed_epoch) at CS;
55 send PROBE(recon_epoch) to probed_members;
56 when received NEW_CONFIG(new_epoch,M) from pj
57 status = leader;
58 (epoch,members, leader)[s0] ← (e,M,pi );
59 next← max{k | phase[k] , start};
60 send NEW_STATE(new_epoch,M, txn, payload, vote,
dec, phase) toM \ pi ;
61 when received NEW_STATE(e,M, txn, payload, vote,
dec, phase) from pj
62 pre: e ≥ new_epoch;
63 initialized← true;
64 status = follower;
65 (epoch,members, leader)[s0] ← (e,M,pj );
66 (txn, payload, vote, dec, phase) ←
(txn, payload, vote, dec, phase);
67 when received CONFIG_CHANGE(s, e,M,pl ) from CS
68 pre: epoch[s] < e ∧ s , s0;
69 (epoch,members, leader)[s] ← (e,M,pl );
70 function retry(k)
71 pre: phase[k] = prepared;
72 forall s ∈ shards(txn[k]) do
73 send PREPARE(txn[k],⊥) to leader[s];
Figure 1: Atomic commit protocol at a process pi in a shard s0. At line 12 we let
L1 = {payload[k] | k < next ∧ phase[k] = decided ∧ dec[k] = commit};
L2 = {payload[k] | k < next ∧ phase[k] = prepared ∧ vote[k] = commit}.
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1. If a process pi receives ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) and replies with
ACCEPT_ACK, then after this andwhile epoch[s] = e atpi , we have
txn⇃k ≺ txn⇃k , vote⇃k ≺ vote⇃k and payload⇃k ≺ payload⇃k ,
where txn, vote and payload were the values of the arrays txn,
vote and payload at the leader of s at e when it sent the corre-
sponding message PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d).
2. Assume that all followers in s at e received ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d)
and responded to it with ACCEPT_ACK, and at the time
the leader of s at e sent the corresponding message
PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d) it had txn⇃k = txn, vote⇃k = vote
and payload⇃k = payload. Whenever at a process in s we have
epoch[s] = e′ > e, we also have txn⇃k ≺ txn, vote⇃k ≺ vote and
payload⇃k ≺ payload.
3. After a process receives PROBE(e) and replies with
PROBE_ACK(_, e, s), it will never send ACCEPT_ACK(s, e′, _, _, _)
with e′ < e.
4. (a) For any messages DECISION(_,k,d1) and DECISION(_,k,d2)
sent to processes in the same shard, we have d1 = d2.
(b) For any messages DECISION(t ,d1) and DECISION(t ,d2) sent,
we have d1 = d2.
5. Assume that all followers in s at e received ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d)
and replied with ACCEPT_ACK. Let the process pi be a member
of s at e′ such that e′ < e. If pi is not a member of s at e then pi
cannot be member of s at any e′′ > e.
Figure 3: Key invariants of the atomic commit protocol. Given a
sequence α , we let length(α) = max{k | α[k] , ⊥} and let α⇃k be
the prefix ofα of lengthk . Given a second sequence β , we let β ≺ α if
length(α)= length(β) ∧ (∀k ≤ length(β). β[k],⊥ =⇒ β[k]=α[k]).
ever been initialized. Our protocol guarantees that a shard can be-
come operational, i.e., start accepting transactions, only after all its
members have been initialized.
The probing phase is complicated by the fact that there may be a
series of failed reconfiguration attempts, where the new leader fails
before initializing all its followers. Hence, probing requires travers-
ing epochs from the current one down, skipping epochs that are not
operational. Probing selects as the new leader the first initialized
process it encounters during this traversal; we can show that this
process is guaranteed to know about all transactions accepted at the
shard, and thus making it the new leader will preserve Invariant 2
(§4).
In more detail, a process pr initiates a reconfiguration of a shard
s by calling reconfigure(s) (line 33). The process picks an epoch
number recon_epoch higher than the epoch of s stored in the config-
uration service and then starts the probing phase, as marked by the
flag probing. The process pr keeps track of the shard being reconfig-
ured in recon_shard, the epoch being probed in probed_epoch and
the membership of this epoch in probed_members. The process
initializes these variables when it first reads the current config-
uration from the configuration service (line 36). It then sends a
PROBE message to the members of the current configuration, ask-
ing them to join the new epoch recon_epoch. Upon receiving a
PROBE(e) message (line 40), a process first checks that the proposed
epoch is equal or higher than the highest epoch it has ever been
asked to join, which the process stores in new_epoch (we always
have epoch[s] ≤ new_epoch at a process in s). In this case, the pro-
cess sets new_epoch to e and changes its status to reconfiguring,
which causes it to stop transaction processing. It then replies to pr
with a PROBE_ACK message, which indicates whether it has been
previously initialized or not. Ifpr finds a process that has previously
been initialized, and hence can serve as the new leader, pr ends
probing (line 45). If pr does not find such a process in the epoch
probed_epoch and receives at least one reply PROBE_ACK from a
process that has not been initialized (line 51), pr can conclude that
the epoch probed_epoch is not operational and will never become
such, because it has convinced at least one of its members to join the
new epoch; this is formalized by Invariant 3. In this case pr starts
probing the preceding epoch. Since no transactions could have been
accepted at the epoch probed_epoch, picking a new leader from an
earlier epoch will not lose any accepted transactions and thus will
not violate Invariant 2.
Once the probing finds a new leader pj for the shard s (line 45),
the process pr computes the membership of the new configura-
tion using a function compute_membership (line 48). We do not
prescribe a particular implementation of this function, except that
the new membership must contain the new leader pj and may only
contain the processes that replied to probing or fresh processes. The
latter can be added to reach the desired level of fault tolerance. Once
the new configuration is computed, pr attempts to store it in the
configuration service using a compare-and-swap operation. This
succeeds only if the current epoch is still the epoch from which pr
started probing, which means that no concurrent reconfiguration
occurred while pr was probing. In this case, pr sends a NEW_CONFIG
message with the new configuration to the new leader of s .
When the new leader of s receives the NEW_CONFIG message
(line 56), it sets next to the length of its sequence of transactions,
epoch[s] to the new epoch and status to leader, which allows it to
start processing new transactions. It then sends a NEW_STATE mes-
sage to its followers, containing its state. Upon receiving this mes-
sage (line 61), a process overwrites its state with the one provided,
changes its status to follower, and sets initialized to true. As part
of the state update, the process also updates its epoch epoch[s0] to
the new one. Hence, the process will not accept transactions from
the new leader until it receives the NEW_STATE message.
When a new configuration of a shard s is persisted in the config-
uration service, the service sends it in a CONFIG_CHANGEmessage to
the members of shards other than s . A process updates the locally
stored configuration upon receiving this message (line 67).
Coordinator recovery. If a process that accepted a transaction
t does not receive the final decision on it, this may be because the
coordinator of t has failed. In this case the process may decide to
become a new coordinator by executing a retry function (line 70).
For this, the process just sends a PREPARE(t ,⊥)message to the lead-
ers of the shards of t , carrying a special undefined value ⊥ as the
payload. If a leader receiving PREPARE(t ,⊥) has already certified
t , it re-sends the corresponding PREPARE_ACK message to the new
coordinator, including the transaction payload and vote (line 6).
Otherwise, if the leader does not have the payload of t , it prepares
the transaction as aborted and with an empty payload ε (line 15).
In either case, the new coordinator will finish processing the trans-
action as usual. The above case when the transaction is aborted
because the leader of a shard does not know its payload may arise
when the old coordinator crashed in between sending PREPARE
messages to different shards. Note that if the old coordinator was
suspected spuriously and will try later to submit the transaction
to a shard where it was aborted, it will just get a PREPARE_ACK
message with an abort vote.
Our protocol allows any number of processes to become coordi-
nators of a transaction at the same time. Nevertheless, the protocol
ensures that they will all reach the same decision, even in case of
reconfigurations. We formalize this by Invariant 4: part (a) ensures
an agreement on the decision on the k-th transaction in the cer-
tification order at a given shard; part (b) ensures a system-wide
agreement on the decision on a given transaction t . The latter part
establishes that the protocol computes a unique decision on each
transaction. Invariant 4 is proved as a corollary of Invariant 2.
Losing undecided transactions. Recall that our protocol uses
the optimization that delegates persisting transactions at followers
to coordinators [1, 8]. We now highlight how this optimization
interacts with transaction certification. Because of the optimization,
transactions prepared by a leader of a shard s can be persisted at
followers out of order. For example, t2 may follow t1 in the certifi-
cation order at the leader, but may be persisted at followers first.
If now the leader of s and the coordinator of t1 crashes before t1
is persisted at followers, t1 will be lost forever, something that is
allowed by Invariant 2 (due to the use of ≺). In this case we lose a
transaction t1 on the basis of which the vote on the transaction t2
was computed (e.g., the payload l1 of t1 was in L2 when the vote
on t2 was computed at line 12). This does not violate correctness,
since the vote on t2 makes sense also in the context excluding t1:
due to distributivity of certification functions (§2), if t2 was allowed
to commit in the presence of t1 (fs ({l1}, l2) = commit), it can also
commit in its absence (fs (∅, l2) = commit). Note that in this case a
decision on t1 could not have been exposed to the client: otherwise
t1 could not get lost due to Invariant 2. Also note that, since we as-
sume the transaction execution component produces payloads with
read-sets containing only values written by committed transactions
(§2), in the above case t2 could not have read a value written by t1.
4 CORRECTNESS
The next theorem states the safety of our protocol, showing that it
implements the TCS specification.
Theorem 4.1. A transaction certification service implemented
using the protocol in Figure 1 is correct with respect to a certification
function f matching the shard-local certification functions fs and дs .
We defer the proof to §A and only sketch the proof of the key
Invariant 2. This relies on auxiliary Invariant 5, which we prove
first.
Proof sketch for Invariant 5. We prove the invariant by in-
duction on e′′. Assume that the invariant holds for all e′′ < e∗.
We now show it for e′′ = e∗. The members of s at e∗ are
computed at line 48 by a reconfiguring process pr using the
compute_membership function, which returns either fresh pro-
cesses or processes that responded to pr ’s probing. Since pi was
a member of s at e ′ < e∗, it is not fresh; then by assumptions on
compute_membership pi must have received PROBE(e∗) from pr
and replied with PROBE_ACK(_, e∗, s). The process pr starts probing
at epoch e∗ − 1 and ends it upon receiving a PROBE_ACK(true, e∗, s)
message. By the induction hypothesis, pi is not a member of s at
any epoch from e∗ − 1 down to e + 1. Hence, if the probing stops
before reaching e, then pi will not be a member of s at e∗, as re-
quired. Assume now that the probing reaches e. By Invariant 3,
each follower in s at e must have sent ACCEPT_ACK(s, e, t) before
receiving PROBE(e∗). Then any member of s at e receiving PROBE(e∗)
will have initialized = true. Hence, if any member of s at e replies
with PROBE_ACK(initialized, e∗, s), we have that initialized = true.
Since the process pr will not move to the preceding epoch until
at least one process replies with PROBE_ACK, this means that the
probing can never go beyond e. Since the processpi is not a member
of e, it cannot be included as a member of s in e∗, as required. □
Proof sketch for Invariant 2. We prove the invariant by induc-
tion on e′. Assume that the invariant holds for all e′ < e′′. We now
show it for e′ = e′′ by induction on the length of the protocol exe-
cution. We only consider the most interesting transition in line 56,
when a process pi becomes a leader of s at an epoch e′′. We show
that after this transition at pi we have txn⇃k ≺ txn, vote⇃k ≺ vote
and payload⇃k ≺ payload.
Since pi was chosen as the leader of s at e′′, this process replied
with PROBE_ACK(true, e′′, s) to a PROBE(e′′). Therefore, pi was a
member of s at an epoch e∗ < e′′ that was being probed. Prob-
ing ends when at least one process sends a PROBE_ACK(true, e′′, s).
From Invariant 3 and the assumption that all followers in e replied
with ACCEPT_ACK to ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d), we can conclude that prob-
ing could no have gone further than e. Hence, e ≤ e∗ < e′′.
Let e0 be the value of epoch[s] at pi right before the transition
at line 56. We have e0 ≥ e, as otherwise pi would not be a member
of s at e and by Invariant 5 could not be picked as the leader of s at
e′′. It is also easy to show that e0 < e′′. Hence, e ≤ e0 < e′′.
If e < e0, then by the induction hypothesis, we have txn⇃k ≺ txn,
vote⇃k ≺ vote and payload⇃k ≺ payload right after the transition
in line 56, as required. Assume now that e0 = e. If pi was the leader
of s at e, then we trivially have txn⇃k ≺ txn, vote⇃k ≺ vote and
payload⇃k ≺ payload right after the transition in line 56, as required.
Otherwise, by Invariant 3, pi must have received ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d)
and responded to it with ACCEPT_ACK(s, e, t) before the transition
in line 56. Then the required follows from Invariant 1. □
We next state liveness properties of our protocol (we again defer
proofs to §A). The reconfiguration procedure in the protocol will
get stuck if it cannot find an initialized process, which may happen
if enough processes crash, so that all shard data is lost. We now
state conditions under which this cannot happen. We associate
two events with each configuration e of a shard s : introduction and
activation. Introduction indicates that the configuration comes into
existence and is triggered when the configuration is successfully
persisted in the configuration service (line 49). Activation indicates
that the configuration becomes operational and is triggered when
all the followers of the configuration have processed the NEW_STATE
messages sent by its leader (line 61).
Once a configuration has been activated, we say that it is active.
We define its lifetime as the time interval between its introduction
and when a succeeding configuration becomes active. Note that not
every introduced configuration necessarily becomes active, since
its leader may never complete the data transfer to the followers.
To ensure our protocol is live we make the following assumption,
similar to the ones made by other protocols with changing mem-
bership [3, 25].
Assumption 1. At least one member in each configuration is non-
faulty throughout the lifetime of a configuration.
The following two theorems show that, under this assumption,
a single reconfiguration makes progress.
Theorem 4.2. If a process pr attempts to reconfigure a shard s
and no other process attempts to reconfigure s simultaneously, then if
pr is non-faulty for long enough, it will eventually introduce a new
configuration.
Theorem 4.3. If a configuration of a shard s is introduced by a
process pr , then it will eventually be activated, provided no process
attempts to reconfigure s simultaneously, and pr and all the members
of the configuration are non-faulty for long enough.
Finally, the following theorem shows that in the absence of fail-
ures or reconfigurations, transaction certification makes progress.
Theorem 4.4. Assume that the current configuration of each shard
is active, all processes are aware of the current configuration of each
shard, and no reconfiguration is in progress. If a transaction is sub-
mitted for certification, then it will eventually be decided, provided
no reconfiguration is attempted and all the processes belonging to the
current configuration of each shard are non-faulty for long enough.
5 EXPLOITING RDMA
We now present a variant of our protocol that uses Remote Direct
Memory Access (RDMA), which follows the design of the FARM
system [8, 23]. By comparing this protocol with that of §3 we high-
light the trade-offs required by the use of RDMA. Due to space
constraints, we defer the pseudocode of our protocol to §C and
describe the required changes in the protocol of §3 only informally.
We assume the same system model as in §2, except that pro-
cesses can communicate using RDMA. This allows a machine to
access the memory of another machine over the network without
involving the latter’s CPU, thus lowering latency. Like FARM, our
protocol uses RDMA to implement a primitive for point-to-point
communication between processes with the following interface.
The primitive allows a sender process to reliably send a message
m to a receiver process pj (send-rdma(m,pj )) by remotely writing
into a specific memory region of pj . The sender then gets an ac-
knowledgement when the message reaches the receiver’s memory
(ack-rdma(m,pj )), sent by the receiver’s network interface card
(NIC) without interrupting its CPU. The receiver is notified at a
later point that a new message is available (deliver-rdma(m,pj )).
Hence, the guarantee provided by ack-rdma(m,pj ) is that the re-
ceiver will eventually deliver the message m, even if the sender
crashes, since the message is already in the receiver’s memory. The
operation open(pi ) grants pi access to a region of the caller’s mem-
ory, and close(pi ) revokes it. Once the latter operation completes,
pi cannot send any message to the caller using send-rdma. Finally,
we assume that the communication primitive includes another op-
eration: flush. This operation blocks the caller until it has delivered
all messages addressed to it that have been acknowledged by its
NIC through an ack-rdma.
To implement the above primitive, the receiver usually keeps a
circular buffer in memory for each process that may send it a mes-
sage [7, 20]. The operation send-rdma(m,pj ) issued by a process
pi appends a message to the corresponding buffer at the receiver
using RDMA writes. Receivers periodically pull messages from the
buffers and deliver them to the application via deliver-rdma. If a
buffer at a processpj gets full, the associated sender process will not
be able to send a message to pj until the latter pulls some messages.
Following FARM, we use the above RDMA-based communication
primitive in our protocol to persists votes and decisions (steps 2
and 3 of Figure 2a). This requires the following changes to the
protocol in Figure 1. First, ACCEPT and DECISIONmessages are sent
using send-rdma instead of send (lines 20 and 29). Second, the
followers do not send explicit ACCEPT_ACK messages to transaction
coordinators (line 25); instead, the latter act once they receive an
RDMA acknowledgement ack-rdma. This makes the checks at
lines 22 and 31 redundant, as followers cannot reject ACCEPT or
DECISIONmessages under any circumstance. The practical rationale
for these changes is that persisting a transaction t at followers using
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Figure 4: Illustrations of (a) a counter-example showing the need to change the reconfiguration protocol when using RDMA; (b) the changed
reconfiguration protocol. Red dashed lines denote RDMA operations. In both cases p1 is the leader of shard s1 and p2 its follower; p3 is the
initial leader of shard s2 and p4 its follower. After the reconfiguration of s2, process p4 is the new leader and a fresh process p5 is its follower.
RDMAminimizes the time during which the transaction is prepared
at leaders, which requires them to vote abort on all transactions
conflicting with t (via the certification function дs , §2); this results
in lower abort rates [2, 8]. Transaction processing at followers (e.g.,
adding them to the local copy of the certification order, line 21) is
done off the critical path of certification.
Unfortunately, the above changes to the failure-free path of the
protocol do not preserve correctness without changes to reconfigu-
ration, as illustrated by an example execution in Figure 4a. In this
execution, two shards s1 and s2 are involved in the certification
of a transaction t , coordinated by a process pc from a third shard.
The transaction is prepared to commit at the leaders p1 and p3 of
both shards (step 1 ), and the commit vote from the leader of s1
(p1) is persisted at the follower p2 using RDMA (step 2 ). Before
the coordinator pc persists the vote from the leader p3 of s2 at the
follower p4, the leader p3 is suspected of failure and a reconfigura-
tion is triggered at shard s2. This promotes the follower p4 to a new
leader and brings online a fresh follower p5. Next, the leader p1 of
s1 suspects the coordinator pc of failure and triggers a reconfigura-
tion to remove it. Once pc is removed from its shard, p1 retries the
processing of t (step 3 , line 70 in Figure 1). The new leader p4 of
s2 does not know about t , so this results in the transaction being
aborted, because its payload at shard s2 is thought to be lost (steps
4 and 5 ). But now the coordinatorpc , who did not actually fail and
still believes s2 is in the old configuration, finishes its processing
by persisting the commit vote of the old leader p3 of s2 at the old
follower p4, which is now the new leader of s2 (step 6 ). Since this
is done via RDMA, p4 cannot reject the vote and, thus, pc commits
the transaction (step 7 ). This violates safety, as two contradictory
results have been externalized. The protocol in §3 is not subject
to this problem, because in that protocol the new leader p4 of the
shard s2 would reject the ACCEPT message due to the failure of the
check at line 22.
To make the RDMA-based protocol correct, we need to change
the reconfiguration protocol so that the whole system participates
in reconfiguration instead of just the affected shard. Figure 4b illus-
trates the message flow of the redesigned reconfiguration protocol.
Processes now maintain a single epoch variable instead of a vec-
tor. The data structures maintained by the external configuration
service and its interface are adjusted accordingly. Like in our pre-
vious commit protocol, the process pr performing reconfiguration
first probes previous configurations by sending PROBE messages.
However, pr now probes all shards. A process receiving PROBE
handles it as before (line 40), but additionally closes all incoming
RDMA connections using close, which guarantees that the pro-
cess accepts no more transactions at its previous epoch. This is
needed because, due to communication via RDMA, the protocol
cannot longer leverage the safety check at line 22. The logic of the
reconfiguring process is also changed: after this process computes
the new configuration and stores it in the configuration service
(line 49), the process sends a new CONFIG_PREPARE message to all
processes in the configuration. Upon receiving CONFIG_PREPARE, a
process updates its locally stored configuration and replies with a
CONFIG_PREPARE_ACKmessage. This ensures that the whole system
is aware of the new configuration before it is activated. Only after
this does the reconfiguring process send a NEW_CONFIG message to
the leaders of the new configuration. Upon receiving NEW_CONFIG
(line 56), a leader pl first calls flush. This guarantees that all the
messages that have been acknowledged as having reached pl ’s
memory will be replicated to followers in NEW_STATE messages;
this is necessary since transaction coordinators may have already
externalized decisions taken based on these acknowledgements.
Finally, processes open RDMA connections to all other processes
in the configuration using open: a leader after sending NEW_STATE
to its followers, and followers upon receiving NEW_STATE (line 61).
The new protocol guarantees that: (*) if a process receives an
ACCEPTmessage for a transaction t while at epoch e, then the leader
that prepared t was at epoch e when it prepared this transaction.
This property is key in proving the correctness of the protocol, as
it provides the same guarantees as the removed guard in line 22,
which we could not leverage due to the use of RDMA. The property
(*) holds because: (i) at any time, a process only maintain RDMA
connections to the members of its current epoch; and (ii) before per-
sisting a vote at a follower, the coordinator of a transaction checks
that the transaction was prepared in its current epoch (line 19).
We now show how the revised reconfiguration protocol prevents
the bug in Figure 4a. In this protocol, when pc attempts to persist
the commit vote at p4 (step 6 ), the latter will be already aware that
pc has been removed from the system and will close the RDMA
connection to it. Thus, pc will be unable to persist the vote at p4
(this would violate the property (*)) and will never gather enough
acknowledgements to decide the transaction. Hence, no contradic-
tory results will be externalized. We state and prove the correctness
of the RDMA-based protocol in §C.
6 RELATEDWORK AND DISCUSSION
Our protocols are inspired by the recent FARM system for transac-
tion processing, which also uses f + 1 replicas per shard and deals
with failures using reconfiguration [8, 23]. FARM was presented
as a complete database system with a number of optimizations,
including the use of RDMA. In contrast, our work distills the core
ideas of FARM into protocols solving the well-defined transaction
certification problem, parametric in the isolation level provided and
rigorously proven correct. This allows us to simplify some aspects
of the FARM design. In particular, FARM has a more complex way
of determining the state of the new leader upon a reconfiguration,
which merges the states from all surviving replicas of the previous
configuration. In contrast, our protocols take the state of any sin-
gle initialized replica. Our reconfiguration protocols also provide
better fault-tolerance guarantees on a par with those of existing
ones [3, 25]. This is because, like Vertical Paxos I [18], our protocols
look through a sequence of configurations to find the new leader,
whereas FARM only considers the previous configuration. Hence,
FARM reconfiguration can get stuck even when there exists a non-
faulty replica with the necessary data. Finally, by presenting two
related protocols using message passing and RDMA, we are able to
identify the price of exploiting RDMA—having to reconfigure the
whole system instead of a single shard.
There have been a number of protocols for solving the atomic
commit problem, which requires reaching a decision on a single
transaction [9, 11, 12, 24]. In contrast to these works, our protocol
solves the more general problem of implementing a Transaction
Certification Service, which requires reaching decisions on a stream
of transactions. This problem more faithfully reflects the require-
ments of modern transaction processing systems [5].
Our protocol weaves together two-phase commit (2PC) [11] and
Vertical Paxos [18], instead of using Paxos replication as a black box.
This is similar to several existing sharded systems for transaction
processing, which integrate protocols for distribution and replica-
tion [5, 15, 21, 27]. However, these systems considered a static set
of 2f + 1 processes per shard, whereas we assume f + 1 processes
and allow the system to be reconfigured. Achieving this correctly
is nontrivial and requires a subtle interplay between the reconfig-
urable replication mechanism and cross-shard coordination. For
example, as we explained in §3, on failures our protocol may lose
information about transactions that influenced votes on other trans-
actions, but this does not violate correctness. As is well-known [19],
using f + 1 instead of 2f + 1 replicas results in somewhat weaker
availability guarantees: upon a single failure, our protocols have to
stop processing transactions while the system is reconfigured.
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A CORRECTNESS OF THE PROTOCOL
Figure 5 summarizes additional invariants that, together with the
invariants listed in Figure 3, are used to prove the correctness of
the protocol. We first prove the nontrivial Invariants 1, 3, 11, 12
and 4 that were not proved in §4. We then prove Theorem 4.1.
A.1 Proof of Invariants
Proof of Invariant 1. Assume that a process pi in s at e receives
ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) and replies with ACCEPT_ACK. We prove that, af-
ter the transition and while epoch[s] = e, pi has txn⇃k ≺ txn⇃k ,
vote⇃k ≺ vote⇃k and payload⇃k ≺ payload⇃k , where txn, vote and
payload are the values of the arrays txn, vote and payload at
the leader pl of s at e when it sent the corresponding message
PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d).
If pi processes ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d), then pi has epoch = e. Thus,
pi has processed NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _) before. Af-
ter processing this message, pi has txn = txn′, vote = vote′ and
payload = payload ′ where txn′, vote′ and payload ′ are the val-
ues of the arrays txn, vote and payload at the leader pl of s at e
when it sent the NEW_STATE message. Let k ′ = length(txn′). By
lines 6, 9 and 59 we have that txn⇃k ′ = txn′, vote⇃k ′ = vote′ and
payload⇃k ′ = payload ′. Therefore, pi has txn⇃k ′ ≺ txn⇃k ′ , vote⇃k ′ ≺
vote⇃k ′ and payload⇃k ′ ≺ payload⇃k ′ while epoch[s] = e. Further-
more, after processing ACCEPT(k, t , l,d), pi has txn[k] = txn[k],
vote[k] = vote[k] and payload[k] = payload[k]. By Invariant 9,
pi has txn[k] = txn[k], vote[k] = vote[k] and payload[k] =
payload[k] while epoch[s] = e.
We now prove that after processing
NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _) and while epoch[s] = e,
pi has txn[k ′′] ∈ {txn[k ′′],⊥}, vote[k ′′] ∈ {vote[k ′′],⊥}
and payload[k ′′] ∈ {payload[k ′′],⊥} for any k ′′ such that
k ′ < k ′′ < k . We prove it by induction on the length of the
protocol execution from the moment in which pi has processed
NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _). The validity of the
property can be affected by only the transition at line 21. Let
ACCEPT(e,k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗) be the message that triggers the transition.
Assume that k ′ < k∗ < k , as otherwise the transition does not
affect the validity of the property. By the induction hypothesis,
pi has txn[k ′′] ∈ {txn[k ′′],⊥}, vote[k ′′] ∈ {vote[k ′′],⊥} and
payload[k ′′] ∈ {payload[k ′′],⊥} for any k ′′ , k∗ such that
k ′ < k ′′ < k after processing ACCEPT(e,k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗). Also,
after processing ACCEPT(e,k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗), pi has txn[k∗] = t∗,
vote[k∗] = d∗ and payload[k∗] = l∗. By lines 6, 9 and 59,
txn[k∗] = t∗, vote[k∗] = d∗ and payload[k∗] = l∗. Then, after
processing ACCEPT(e,k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗), pi has txn[k∗] = txn[k∗],
vote[k∗] = vote[k∗] and payload[k∗] = payload[k∗]. This proves
that, after processing NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _)
and while epoch[s] = e, pi has txn[k ′′] ∈ {txn[k ′′],⊥},
vote[k ′′] ∈ {vote[k ′′],⊥} and payload[k ′′] ∈ {payload[k ′′],⊥} for
any k ′′ such that k ′ < k ′′ < k . We have already proved that (i) pi
has txn⇃k ′ ≺ txn⇃k ′ , vote⇃k ′ ≺ vote⇃k ′ and payload⇃k ′ ≺ payload⇃k ′
after processing NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _) and
while epoch[s] = e; and that (ii) pi has txn[k] = txn[k],
vote[k] = vote[k] and payload[k] = payload[k] after process-
ing ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) and while epoch[s] = e. Hence, pi has
txn⇃k ≺ txn⇃k , vote⇃k ≺ vote⇃k and payload⇃k ≺ payload⇃k
6. If ACCEPT(e,k, t1, l1,d1) and ACCEPT(e,k, t2, l2,d2)messages are
sent to the same shard, then t1 = t2, l1 = l2 and d1 = d2.
7. (a) If at a process in a shard s we have vote[k] = commit
then payload[k] = (l | s), where l is the payload of txn[k]
submitted in the certify(txn[k], l).
(b) If at a process in a shard s we have vote[k] = abort then
payload[k] = {(l | s) | ε}, where l is the payload of txn[k]
submitted in the certify(txn[k], l).
8. At any process, we always have new_epoch ≥ epoch[s0].
9. If ACCEPT(e,k1, t , _, _) and ACCEPT(e,k2, t , _, _) messages are
sent to the same shard, then k1 = k2.
10. At any process, all transactions in the txn array are distinct.
11. (a) Assume that all followers in s at e1 have re-
ceived ACCEPT(e1,k, t1, l1,d1) and replied with
ACCEPT_ACK(s, e1,k, t1,d1). Assume that all follow-
ers in s at e2 have received ACCEPT(e2,k, t2, l2,d2) and
replied with ACCEPT_ACK(s, e2,k, t2,d2). Then t1 = t2,
l1 = l2 and d1 = d2.
(b) Assume that all followers in s at e1 have re-
ceived ACCEPT(e1,k1, t , l1,d1) and replied with
ACCEPT_ACK(s, e1,k1, t ,d1). Assume that all follow-
ers in s at e2 have received ACCEPT(e2,k2, t , l2,d2) and
replied with ACCEPT_ACK(s, e2,k2, t ,d2). Then k1 = k2,
l1 = l2 and d1 = d2.
12. (a) If at a process in a shard s we have epoch[s] =
e′, phase[k] = decided and dec[k] = d , then a
DECISION(e,k,d)message has been sent to s , where e ≤ e′.
(b) If at a process we have phase[k] = decided and dec[k] =
commit, then vote[k] = commit.
Figure 5: Additional invariants of the atomic commit protocol used
in its proof of correctness.
after processing ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) and while epoch[s] = e, as
required. □
Proof of Invariant 3. When pi processed PROBE(e), it set
status = reconfiguring. This prevents pi from processing
any ACCEPT message until it processes a NEW_CONFIG(e∗, _) or a
NEW_STATE(e∗, _, _, _, _, _, _). When pi processed PROBE(e), it also
sets new_epoch = e. By the checks in lines 56 and 62 and by the
fact that new_epoch can never decrease, this guarantees that pi
only handles any of these messages if e∗ ≥ new_epoch. Hence,
by the time pi is able to process ACCEPT messages again it will
have epoch[s] = e∗ > e′. By the check in line 22 and the
fact that the protocol trivially guarantees that epoch[s] never de-
creases, pi will never send ACCEPT_ACK(s, e′, _, _, _) after sending a
PROBE_ACK(_, e, s), as required. □
Proof of Invariant 11. (a) Assume that all followers in s
at e1 have received ACCEPT(e1,k, t1, l1,d1) and replied with
ACCEPT_ACK(s, e1,k, t1,d1). Assume that all followers in s
at e2 have received ACCEPT(e2,k, t2, l2,d2) and replied with
ACCEPT_ACK(s, e2,k, t2,d2). Assume without loss of generality that
e1 ≤ e2. If e1 = e2, then by Invariant 6 we must have t1 = t2, l1 = l2
and d1 = d2. Assume now that e1 < e2. By Invariant 2, when the
leader of s at e2 sent the PREPARE_ACK(e2, s,k, t2, l2,d2) message it
has txn[k] = t1, vote[k] = d1 and payload[k] = l1. But then due to
the check at line 6, we again must have t1 = t2, l1 = l2 and d1 = d2.
(b) Assume that all followers in s at e1 have received
ACCEPT(e1,k1, t , l1,d1) and replied with ACCEPT_ACK(s, e1,k1, t ,d1).
Assume that all followers in s at e2 have received
ACCEPT(e2,k2, t , l2,d2) and replied with ACCEPT_ACK(s, e2,k2, t ,d2).
Assume without loss of generality that e1 ≤ e2. We first show
that k1 = k2. If e1 = e2, then we must have k1 = k2 by Invariant 9.
Assume now that e1 < e2. By Invariant 2, when the leader of s at e2
sent the PREPARE_ACK(e2, s,k2, t , l2,d2) message it has txn[k1] = t .
But then due to the check at line 6 and Invariant 10, we again must
have k1 = k2. Hence, k1 = k2. But then by Invariant 11a we must
also have l1 = l2 and d1 = d2. □
Proof of Invariant 12. (a) Assume that a process pi in shard
s has epoch[s] = e′, phase[k] = decided and dec[k] = d . We
show that then a DECISION(e,k,d) message has been sent to s ,
where e ≤ e′. We prove the invariant by induction on the length
of the protocol execution. The validity of the property can be af-
fected by only the transitions at lines 30 and 61. First, consider the
transition at line 30. By the induction hypothesis, pi satisfies the
property before handling the DECISION(e,k,d)message that causes
the transition. Given that the message is only handled if e ≤ e′,
lines 32 and 32 trivially preserve the invariant. Finally, consider the
transition at line 61. The transition is triggered when pi receives
a NEW_STATE(e′, _, _, _, _, dec, phase). By the induction hypothesis,
the leader of s at e′ satisfies the required before the transition. The
process pi simply substitutes its dec and phase arrays by the arrays
dec and phase. Therefore, pi will also satisfy the required after the
transition.
(b) Follows from item (a) and Invariant 2. □
Proof of Invariant 4. Follows from Invariant 11, since, if a co-
ordinator has computed the final decision on a transaction, then all
followers in each relevant shard at a given epoch have accepted a
corresponding vote. □
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
To facilitate the proof of Theorem 4.1, we first introduce a low-level
specification TCS-LL, and prove that it is correctly implemented by
the atomic commit protocol (Lemma A.1). We then show that every
history satisfying TCS-LL is correct with respect to f (Lemma A.3).
The low-level specification TCS-LL is defined as follows.
Consider a history h. Let T denote the set of trans-
actions t such that certify(t , _) is an event in h,
and d[t] denote the decision value d of t ∈ T if
decide(t ,d) is an event in h. The history h satisfies
TCS-LL if for some of transactions t ∈ T and shards
s ∈ shards(t) there exist ds [t] ∈ D, poss [t] ∈ N,
ploads [t] ∈ L and Ts [t], Ps [t] ∈ 2T such that all the
constraints in Figure 6 are satisfied. A protocol is a
correct implementation of TCS-LL if each of its finite
histories satisfies TCS-LL.
Lemma A.1. The atomic commit protocol in Figures 1 is a correct
implementation of TCS-LL.
∀t .d[t] =
l
{ds [t] | s ∈ shards(t)} (6)
∀t1, t2, s . t1 , t2 =⇒ poss [t1] , poss [t2] (7)
∀t , l , s . certify(t , l) ∈ h =⇒
(ds [t] = commit =⇒ ploads [t] = (l | s)) ∧
(ds [t] = abort =⇒ ploads [t] ∈ {(l | s), ε}) (8)
∀t , s .ds [t] ⊑
fs (ploads (Ts [t]), ploads [t]) ⊓ дs (ploads (Ps [t]), ploads [t]) (9)
∀t , s .Ts [t] =
{t ′ | poss [t ′] < poss [t] ∧ d[t ′] = commit} \ Ps [t] (10)
∀t , s . Ps [t] ⊆ {t ′ | poss [t ′] < poss [t] ∧ ds [t ′] = commit} (11)
∀t , t ′, s . t ′ ≺rt t ∧ s ∈ shards(t ′) ∩ shards(t) =⇒
poss [t ′] < poss [t] (12)
≺rt ∪ ≺dec is acyclic, (13)
where
∀x ,y ∈ {abort | commit}. x ⊑ y ⇐⇒
x = y ∨ (x = abort ∧ y = commit)
∀t , t ′. t ′ ≺rt t ⇐⇒ decide(t ′, _) ≺h certify(t , _)
∀t , t ′. t ′ ≺dec t ⇐⇒ ∃s . t ′ ∈ Ts [t] ∨
(poss [t ′]< poss [t]∧ds [t ′]= commit∧d[t ′]=abort∧t ′ < Ps [t])
Figure 6: Constraints on the votes computed by the atomic commit
protocol. In (9), we lift the array ploads to a set of transactions.
Proof Fix a finite execution of the atomic commit protocol with
a history h. LetT be the set of transactions t such that certify(t , l)
occurs in h. For some of transactions t ∈ T , l ∈ L, and shards
s ∈ shards(t), we define the certification order position poss [t],
ploads [t] and a vote ds [t] computed by the protocol as follows:
Consider t ∈ T and s ∈ shards(t). Assume that all
followers in s at e received ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) and
responded to it with ACCEPT_ACK(s, e,k, t ,d). Then,
we let poss [txn[k]] = k , ploads [txn[k]] = l and
ds [txn[k]] = d .
According to Invariants 2 and 10, this defines poss [t], ploads [t] and
ds [t] uniquely and (7) in Figure 6 holds. Furthermore, by the struc-
ture of the handler at line 26, for each t such that decide(t ,d[t])
occurs in h, ds [t] is defined for all s ∈ shards(t) and (6) holds. By
Invariant 7, (8) holds.
We now prove (12). Consider t , t ′, s such that
decide(t , _) ≺h certify(t ′, _) ∧ s ∈ shards(t) ∩ shards(t ′).
Let DECISION(e, poss [t], _) be the message sent to the shard s when
the decide(t , _) action was generated. Let e′ be some epoch at
which poss [t ′] is defined according to the above definition. As-
sume first that e′ < e. Then by Invariant 2 when the leader of e
starts operating, it has txn[poss [t ′]] = t ′. But then certify(t ′, _)
must have occurred before the decide(t , _). Hence, e ≤ e′. By In-
variant 2 when the leader of s at e′ receives PREPARE(t ′, _), it has
txn[poss [t]] = t . But then poss [t] < poss [t ′], which proves (12).
We prove (9)-(11) using the following proposition.
Proposition A.2. The following always holds at any process in a
shard s :
∀k . (vote[k] is defined) =⇒
∃T , P . vote[k] ⊑ fs (topload(T , txn, payload), payload[k]) ⊓
дs (topload(P , txn, payload), payload[k]) ∧
T = {txn[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ vote[k ′] = commit ∧
d[txn[k ′]] = commit} \ P ∧
P ⊆ {txn[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ vote[k ′] = commit} ∧
(∀k ′. txn[k ′] ∈ T =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′], commit) has been sent)) ∧
(∀k ′ < k . vote[k ′] = commit ∧ txn[k ′] < T ∪ P =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′],abort) has been sent));
(14)
where the function topload : (T ×(N→ T)×(N→ L)) → L deter-
mines the payload that a process has stored for a given transaction, i.e.,
for any transaction t ∈ T , and arrays txn ∈ N→ T and payload ∈
N → L, topload(t , txn, payload) = {payload[k] | t = txn[k]}. We
lift the function to sets of transactions: for any set of transactions
T ⊆ T and arrays txn ∈ N → T and payload ∈ N → L, we have
topload(T , txn, payload) = {topload(t , txn, payload) | t ∈ T }.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the length of the protocol
execution. The validity of the above property can be nontrivially
affected only by the transitions at lines 12, 15, 24, and 66.
First consider the transition at line 12, which computes vote[k]
as follows:
vote[k] = fs (L1, payload[k]) ⊓ дs (L2, payload[k]);
L1 = {payload[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ phase[k ′] = decided ∧
dec[k ′] = commit};
L2 = {payload[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ phase[k ′] = prepared ∧
vote[k ′] = commit}.
Then for some T , P we have
vote[k] ⊑ fs (topload(T , txn, payload), payload[k]) ⊓
дs (topload(P , txn, payload), payload[k]) ∧
T = {txn[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ phase[k ′] = decided ∧
dec[k ′] = commit} ∧
P = {txn[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ phase[k ′] = prepared ∧
vote[k ′] = commit}.
From the last two conjuncts and Invariant 12 we get
T = {txn[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ vote[k ′] = commit ∧
d[txn[k ′]] = commit} \ P ∧
(∀k ′. txn[k ′] ∈ T =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′], commit) has been sent)) ∧
(∀k ′ < k . vote[k ′] = commit ∧ txn[k ′] < T ∪ P =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′],abort) has been sent)),
which implies the required.
We next consider the transition at line 24 by a process pi . The
induction hypothesis implies that, before the transition at line 24,
we have (14) at pi . After processing the ACCEPT(e′′,k ′, t , l,d), pi
modifies its txn, vote, payload and phase arrays by assigning the
k ′ position. Fix a k . We distinguish three cases:
(1) k < k ′. The required trivially follows from the induction
hypothesis.
(2) k = k ′. By Invariant 1, after processing the ACCEPT message,
pi has txn⇃k ′ ≺ txn⇃k ′ , vote⇃k ′ ≺ vote⇃k ′ and payload⇃k ′ ≺
payload⇃k ′ , where txn, vote and payload are the values of the
arrays txn, vote and payload at the leader of s at e′′ when
it sent the PREPARE_ACK(e′′, s,k ′, t , l,d). By the induction
hypothesis, the leader of s at e′′ satisfies the required before
sending the PREPARE_ACK message. Hence, by the fact that
fs and дs are distributive, the required is guaranteed at pi
for vote[k ′] after the transition.
(3) k > k ′. We have that before processing the
ACCEPT(e′′,k ′, t , l,d) message, pi has processed
NEW_STATE(e′′, _, _, txn, _, _, _). After processing NEW_STATE,
pi has txn = txn, vote = vote and payload = payload where
txn, vote and payload are the arrays txn, vote and payload at
the leader of s at e′′ when it sent the NEW_STATEmessage. Let
m = length(txn) at pi after processing ACCEPT(e′′,k ′, t , l,d).
Consider first the case when m = length(txn). Then
pi , after processing the NEW_STATE message and before
processing ACCEPT(e′′,k ′, t , l,d) may have only processed
ACCEPT(e′′,k∗, _, _, _) such that k∗ ≤ m. Lines 9 and 59 triv-
ially guarantee that after processing ACCEPT(e′′,k ′, t , l,d),pi
still has txn = txn, vote = vote and payload = payload. By
the induction hypothesis, the leader of s at e′′ satisfies the re-
quired before sending the NEW_STATE. Hence, the required is
guaranteed at pi after the transition whenm = length(txn).
Consider now the case when m > length(txn). There-
fore, pi must have received an ACCEPT(e′′,m, _, _, _) mes-
sage and responded to it with ACCEPT_ACK before pro-
cessing ACCEPT(e′′,k ′, t , l,d). By Invariant 1, after process-
ing ACCEPT(e′′,m, _, _, _) and while epoch[s] = e′′, pi
has txn⇃m ≺ txn′⇃m , vote⇃m ≺ vote′⇃m and payload⇃m ≺
payload ′⇃m , where txn′, vote′ and payload ′ are the values of
the arrays txn, vote and payload at the leader of s at e′′ when
it sent the PREPARE_ACK(e′′, s,m, _, _, _). Thus, after pro-
cessing ACCEPT(e′′,k ′, _, _, _), pi still has txn⇃m ≺ txn′⇃m ,
vote⇃m ≺ vote′⇃m and payload⇃m ≺ payload ′⇃m . By the in-
duction hypothesis, the leader of s at e′′ satisfies the required
before sending PREPARE_ACK(e′′, s,m, _, _, _). Hence by the
fact that fs andдs are distributive, the required is guaranteed
at pi after the transition.
Finally, the transitions at lines 15 and 66 are handled easily. □
We now prove (9)-(11). Take the earliest point in the execution
where ds [t] can be determined as per the definition given earlier.
Let e be the epoch used in this definition. Then by Proposition A.2
at this point, at the leader of s at e for some T , P we have
ds [t] ⊑ fs (topload(T , txn, payload), topload(t , txn, payload)) ⊓
дs (topload(P , txn, payload), topload(t , txn, payload)) ∧
T = {txn[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ vote[k ′] = commit ∧
d[txn[k ′]] = commit} \ Ps [t] ∧
P ⊆ {txn[k ′] | k ′ < k ∧ vote[k ′] = commit} ∧
(∀k ′. txn[k ′] ∈ T =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′], commit) has been sent)) ∧
(∀k ′ < k . vote[k ′] = commit ∧ txn[k ′] < T ∪ P =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′],abort) has been sent)).
For the T , P fixed above, and Invariant 2 we get
Ts [t] = T = {t ′ | poss [t ′] < poss [t] ∧ d[t ′] = commit} \ Ps [t]
Ps [t] = P \ {t | t ∈ P ∧ poss [t] is not defined} ⊆
{t ′ | poss [t ′] < poss [t] ∧ ds [t ′] = commit}
(∀k ′. txn[k ′] ∈ Ts [t] =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′], commit) has been sent)) ∧
(∀k ′ < k . vote[k ′] = commit ∧ txn[k ′] < Ts [t] ∪ Ps [t] =⇒
(DECISION(txn[k ′],abort) has been sent)),
(15)
which establishes (10) and (11).
By Invariant 7, (8) and by the fact that fs and дs are distributive,
we get
ds [t] ⊑ fs (ploads (Ts [t]), ploads [t]) ⊓ дs (ploads (Ps [t]), ploads [t]),
which establishes (9) for the Ts [t], Ps [t] fixed above.
Finally, we prove (13). To this end, we show that if t ′ ≺rt t or
t ′ ≺dec t , then a DECISION(t ′,d[t ′]) message was sent in the exe-
cution, and this had happened before any DECISION(t , _) message
was sent. The case of t ′ ≺rt t is trivial and therefore we only con-
sider the case of t ′ ≺dec t . Take the earliest point in the execution
where we can defineds [t], and hence,Ts [t] and Ps [t] (by (15)). Then
a DECISION(t , _) message could not have been sent by this point.
Assume first that t ′ ∈ Ts [t]. Then by (15) a DECISION(t ′, commit)
message has been sent earlier. Now assume that
poss [t ′] < poss [t] ∧ds [t ′] = commit∧d[t ′] = abort∧ t ′ < Ps [t].
Then at this point txn[poss [t ′]] = t ′ and vote[poss [t ′]] = commit,
so that by (15) a DECISION(t ′,abort)message has been sent earlier.
We have thus proved (13). □
Lemma A.3. If shard-local certification functions fs and дs sat-
isfy (3)-(5), then every history satisfying TCS-LL is correct with respect
to f .
Proof. This follows the proof of Theorem 1 in [5]1 with minimal
adjustments. □
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Follows from Lemmas A.1 and A.3. □
B PROOF OF LIVENESS
We prove the nontrivial Theorem 4.2:
If a process pr attempts to reconfigure a shard s and
no other process attempts to reconfigure s simultane-
ously, then if pr is non-faulty for long enough, it will
eventually introduce a new configuration.
1Appendix A of https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00688.
Proof. Assume that a process pr attempts to reconfigure a shard
s . Take the earliest point in the execution where pr calls the
reconfigure function. Let e be the epoch of the last active config-
uration of s at that point in time. The process pr first queries the
configuration service to find the latest introduced configuration of
s to start the probing. Let e′ be the epoch of this configuration.
Assume that the probing eventually ends. After this happens,
pr computes the membership of the new configuration c (lines 48).
Then pr attempts to write c into the configuration service. Since
there is not other process attempting to reconfigure s simultane-
ously, pr will succeed. This last step introduces c , as required.
We now prove that the probing eventually ends, provided that
no other process attempts reconfiguring s simultaneously and pr
is non-faulty for long enough. The probing procedure proceeds
by iterations in epoch descending order, starting by probing the
members of s at e′. The process pr only moves to the next iter-
ation after receiving at least one reply from a member of s at
the epoch being currently probed while no process replies with
PROBE_ACK(true, e + 1, s). Consider an arbitrary epoch e′′ such
that e′′ ≤ e′. If pr is probing the members of s at e′′, then pr has
received a PROBE_ACK(false, e + 1, s) from at least one member of
s at each epoch e∗ such that e′′ < e∗ ≤ e′. Furthermore, because of
line 43 and the check in line 62, none of these configurations will
ever become active. Then by Assumption 1 and the fact that there is
no concurrent reconfiguration, pr is guaranteed to receive at least
one reply from a member of s at e′′. Hence, for each epoch e′′ that
pr probes, either the whole probing terminates, or pr will even-
tually move to probe the previous epoch. Assume that pr reaches
epoch e. By line 43 and the check in line 62, the configurations of
s with epoch e∗, such that e < e∗ ≤ e′, will never become active.
Then by Assumption 1 and the fact that there is no concurrent
reconfiguration, pr is guaranteed to receive at least one reply from
a member of s at e. That the configuration of s with epoch e became
active implies that every member of s at e has initialized = true
when being probed. Hence, the probing procedure is guaranteed to
finish. □
C RDMA-BASED ATOMIC COMMIT
PROTOCOL
We give the pseudocode of the RDMA-based protocol in Figures 7
and 8. The redesigned reconfiguration protocol uses a slightly dif-
ferent set of variables. Instead of the variable probing, the protocol
uses the variable rec_status ∈ {ready, probing, installing} to
record whether a process is ready to start reconfiguring the sys-
tem, probing the system or disseminating a new configuration. A
variable connections ∈ 2P records the set of processes to which
a process currently maintains an open RDMA connection. Also,
the variables probed_epoch and probed_members are now arrays:
probed_epoch ∈ S → N and probed_members ∈ S → 2P . This
change is required because now reconfiguration involves all shards,
instead of a single one. Finally, the data structures maintained by
the external configuration service and its interface are adjusted as
well. Instead of keeping a separate data structure with each shard’s
sequence of configurations, the configuration service keeps a single
data structure with the system’s sequence of configurations param-
eterized by shard. Moreover, none of the three operations of the
configuration service’s interface take a shard identifier as argument
anymore.
To prove the correctness of the protocol, apart from the set
of invariants (Figures 3 and 5) used to prove the correctness of
the atomic commit protocol in Figure 1, we require the following
invariant, formalizing property (*) from §5:
13. Assume that the coordinator of a transaction t receives
a PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d) message and sends an
ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) message to a process pi . If pi receives
the ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) message, then it has epoch = e right
before this.
This invariant trivially holds in the atomic commit protocol in
Figure 1 but is nontrivial in the RDMA-based protocol.
We first prove Invariant 13. Then we prove Invariants 3 and 1,
whose proofs rely on Invariant 13. We skip the proofs for the rest of
the invariants, as these are similar to the proofs of the invariants in
Figures 3 and 5 of the protocol in Figure 1, with small adjustments
due to differences in the protocols’ pseudocodes. Finally, we prove
the following theorem.
Theorem C.1. A transaction certification service implemented
using the protocol in Figures 7 and 8 is correct with respect to a certi-
fication function f matching the shard-local certification functions
fs and дs .
Proof of Invariant 13. Assume that the coordinatorpc of a trans-
action t receives a PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d) message and sends
an ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) message to a process pi . Assume further that
pi receives the ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) message and let epoch = e′ at pi
right before this transition. We prove that e′ = e.
The leader pl of s at e must have received PREPARE(t , l) and
replied with PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d), and when it received
the message, it had epoch = e. Thus, pl must have received
NEW_CONFIG(e) earlier. Also, by the check in line 92, pi must be
a member of e. Then pi had processed CONFIG_PREPARE(e, _, _)
before pc sent the ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) message to pi . When pi pro-
cessed CONFIG_PREPARE(e, _, _), it had no open connections, ei-
ther because it was probed (line 114) or because it is a new
process. The process pi only opens them, allowing it to receive
ACCEPT(k, t , l,d), when it receives either a NEW_CONFIG(e∗) or a
NEW_STATE(e∗, _, _, _, _, _)message, so that e ′ ≥ e∗. By the fact that
new_epoch gets updated when processing CONFIG_PREPARE and
by the checks in lines 141 and 148, we have that e∗ ≥ e. Then e′ ≥ e.
Assume now that e′ > e. When pi processes ACCEPT(k, t , l,d)
it has epoch = e′. Then pi has received NEW_CONFIG(e′) or
NEW_STATE(e′, _, _, _, _, _) before. When processing any of these
messages, pi has no open connections. Therefore, pc must
have sent ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) after pi processed NEW_CONFIG(e′) or
NEW_STATE(e′, _, _, _, _, _). Furthermore, by the checks in lines 154
and 159, pi only establishes connections to the members of e′. Thus,
pc must be a member of e′ to successfully send ACCEPT(k, t , l,d)
to pi . Then pc must have received CONFIG_PREPARE(e′, _, _)
and replied with CONFIG_PREPARE_ACK(e′) before pi pro-
cessed NEW_CONFIG(e′) or NEW_STATE(e′, _, _, _, _, _) and
therefore before sending ACCEPT(k, t , l,d). When processing
CONFIG_PREPARE(e′, _, _), pc has no open connections. Thus, pc
can only send ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) after receiving NEW_CONFIG(e∗) or
NEW_STATE(e∗, _, _, _, _, _), where e∗ ≥ e′. This implies that pc re-
ceived PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d) after setting epoch = e∗ ≥ e ′ > e .
By the check in line 92, pc then would never send ACCEPT(k, t , l,d)
to pi at this point. Hence, we must have e′ ≤ e, which together
with e′ ≥ e implies e′ = e. □
Proof of Invariant 1. Assume that a process pi in s at e pro-
cesses ACCEPT(k, t , l,d). We prove that, after the transition and
while epoch[s] = e, pi has txn⇃k ≺ txn⇃k , vote⇃k ≺ vote⇃k and
payload⇃k ≺ payload⇃k , where txn, vote and payload are the val-
ues of the arrays txn, vote and payload at the leaderpl of s at ewhen
it sent the corresponding message PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d).
By Invariant 13, if pi processes ACCEPT(k, t , l,d),
then pi has epoch = e. Thus, pi has processed
NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _) before. After pro-
cessing this message, pi has txn = txn′, vote = vote′
and payload = payload ′ where txn′, vote′ and payload ′
are the values of the arrays txn, vote and payload at the
leader pl of s at e when it sent the NEW_STATE message. Let
k ′ = length(txn′). By lines 79, 82 and 145 we have that
txn⇃k ′ = txn′, vote⇃k ′ = vote′ and payload⇃k ′ = payload ′. By
Invariant 13, pi has txn⇃k ′ ≺ txn⇃k ′ , vote⇃k ′ ≺ vote⇃k ′ and
payload⇃k ′ ≺ payload⇃k ′ while epoch[s] = e. Furthermore,
after processing ACCEPT(k, t , l,d), pi has txn[k] = txn[k],
vote[k] = vote[k] and payload[k] = payload[k]. By Invari-
ants 9 and 13, pi has txn[k] = txn[k], vote[k] = vote[k] and
payload[k] = payload[k] while epoch[s] = e.
We now prove that after processing
NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _) and while epoch[s] = e,
pi has txn[k ′′] ∈ {txn[k ′′],⊥}, vote[k ′′] ∈ {vote[k ′′],⊥}
and payload[k ′′] ∈ {payload[k ′′],⊥} for any k ′′ such that
k ′ < k ′′ < k . We prove it by induction on the length of the
protocol execution from the moment in which pi has processed
NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _). The validity of the
property can be affected by only the transition at line 94. Let
ACCEPT(k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗) be the message that triggers the transition.
Assume that k ′ < k∗ < k , as otherwise the transition does not
affect the validity of the property. By the induction hypothesis,
pi has txn[k ′′] ∈ {txn[k ′′],⊥}, vote[k ′′] ∈ {vote[k ′′],⊥} and
payload[k ′′] ∈ {payload[k ′′],⊥} for any k ′′ , k∗ such that
k ′ < k ′′ < k after processing ACCEPT(e,k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗). Also,
after processing ACCEPT(e,k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗), pi has txn[k∗] = t∗,
vote[k∗] = d∗ and payload[k∗] = l∗. By Invariant 13, t∗ must have
been prepared by the leaderpl of s at e. Then, by lines 79, 82 and 145,
txn[k∗] = t∗, vote[k∗] = d∗ and payload[k∗] = l∗. Then, after
processing ACCEPT(e,k∗, t∗, l∗,d∗), pi has txn[k∗] = txn[k∗],
vote[k∗] = vote[k∗] and payload[k∗] = payload[k∗].
We have already proved that (i) pi has txn⇃k ′ ≺ txn⇃k ′ ,
vote⇃k ′ ≺ vote⇃k ′ and payload⇃k ′ ≺ payload⇃k ′ after processing
NEW_STATE(e, txn′, payload ′, vote′, _, _) and while epoch[s] = e;
and that (ii) pi has txn[k] = txn[k], vote[k] = vote[k] and
payload[k] = payload[k] after processing ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d) and
while epoch[s] = e. Hence, pi has txn⇃k ≺ txn⇃k , vote⇃k ≺ vote⇃k
and payload⇃k ≺ payload⇃k after processing ACCEPT(e,k, t , l,d)
and while epoch[s] = e, as required. □
Proof of Invariant 3. When pi processed PROBE(e), it closed
all connections. This prevents pi from acknowledging any
ACCEPT message until it processes a NEW_CONFIG(e∗) or a
NEW_STATE(e∗, _, _, _, _, _). When pi processed PROBE(e), it also sets
new_epoch = e. By the checks in lines 141 and 148 and by the fact
that new_epoch can never decrease, this guarantees that pi only
handles any of these messages if e∗ ≥ e . Hence, by the time pi is
able to process ACCEPTmessages again it will have epoch = e∗ > e′.
Since epoch never decreases at a process, from this point on, by
Invariant 13, pi will not process any ACCEPT message prepared in
an epoch preceding e∗, as required. □
Lemma C.2. The atomic commit protocol in Figures 7 and 8 is a
correct implementation of TCS-LL.
Proof This follows the proof of Lemma A.1 with minimal adjust-
ments. □
Proof of Theorem C.1. Follows from Lemmas C.2 and A.3. □
74 function certify(t , l)
75 forall s ∈ shards(t) do
76 send PREPARE(t , (l | s)) to leader[s];
77 when received PREPARE(t , l) from pj
78 pre: status = leader;
79 if ∃k . t = txn[k] then
80 send PREPARE_ACK(epoch, s0,k, txn[k],
payload[k], vote[k]) to pj
81 else
82 next← next + 1;
83 (txn, phase)[next] ← (t , prepared);
84 if l , ⊥ then
85 vote[next] ← fs0 (L1, l) ⊓ дs0 (L2, l);
86 payload[next] ← l;
87 else
88 vote[next] ← abort;
89 payload[next] ← ε ;
90 send PREPARE_ACK(epoch, s0, next, t ,
payload[next], vote[next]) to pj ;
91 when received PREPARE_ACK(e, s,k, t , l,d)
92 pre: e = epoch;
93 send-rdma ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) to members[s] \ leader[s];
94 when received-rdma ACCEPT(k, t , l,d) from pj
95 (txn, payload, vote, phase)[k] ← (t , l,d, prepared);
96 when for every s ∈ shards(t) and pj ∈ members[s] \ leader[s]
received an ack-rdma from pj for ACCEPT(ks , t , ls ,ds ) sent
in response to PREPARE_ACK(e, s,ks , t , ls ,ds )
97 pre: e = epoch;
98 send DECISION(t ,ds ∈shards(t ) ds ) to client(t);
99 forall s ∈ shards(t) do
100 send-rdma DECISION(ks ,
d
s ∈shards(t ) ds )
to members[s];
101 when received-rdma DECISION(k,d)
102 (dec, phase)[k] ← (d,decided);
Figure 7: RDMA-based protocol at a process pi in a shard s0: failure-free case. At line 85 we let
L1 = {payload[k] | k < next ∧ phase[k] = decided ∧ dec[k] = commit};
L2 = {payload[k] | k < next ∧ phase[k] = prepared ∧ vote[k] = commit}.
103 function reconfigure()
104 pre: rec_status = ready;
105 rec_status← probing;
106 ⟨e, probed_members, _⟩ ← get_last() at CS;
107 forall s ∈ S do
108 probed_epoch[s] ← e;
109 recon_epoch← e + 1;
110 send PROBE(recon_epoch) to probed_members;
111 when received PROBE(e) from pj
112 pre: e ≥ new_epoch;
113 status← reconfiguring;
114 multiclose(connections);
115 new_epoch← e;
116 send PROBE_ACK(initialized, e, s0) to pj ;
117 when for every s ∈ shards(t) received a
PROBE_ACK(true, recon_epoch, s)
118 pre: rec_status = probing;
119 rec_status← ready;
120 ⟨recon_members, recon_leaders⟩ ← compute_membership();
121 var r ← compare_and_swap (recon_epoch − 1,
⟨recon_epoch, recon_members, recon_leaders⟩) at CS;
122 if r then
123 rec_status← installing;
124 send CONFIG_PREPARE(recon_epoch, recon_members,
recon_leaders) to recon_members;
125 non-deterministically when received
PROBE_ACK(false, recon_epoch, s) from pj ∈ probed_members[s]
and no PROBE_ACK(true, recon_epoch, s)
126 pre: rec_status = probing;
127 probed_epoch[s] ← probed_epoch[s] − 1;
128 ⟨_,M, _⟩ ← get(probed_epoch[s]) at CS;
129 probed_members[s] ← M[s];
130 send PROBE(recon_epoch) to probed_members[s];
131 when received CONFIG_PREPARE(e,M, leaders) from pj
132 pre: e ≥ new_epoch;
133 members← M;
134 leader← leaders;
135 new_epoch = e;
136 send CONFIG_PREPARE_ACK(e) to pj ;
137 when received CONFIG_PREPARE_ACK(e) from every
pj ∈ recon_members
138 pre: rec_status = installing;
139 send NEW_CONFIG(e) to recon_leaders;
140 rec_status← ready;
141 when received NEW_CONFIG(new_epoch) from pj
142 flush();
143 status← leader;
144 epoch← new_epoch;
145 next← max{k | phase[k] , start};
146 send NEW_STATE(epoch, txn, payload,
vote, dec, phase) to members[s0] \ pi ;
147 send CONNECT(epoch) to members \ {pi };
148 when received NEW_STATE(new_epoch, txn, payload,
vote, dec, phase) from pj
149 status← follower;
150 epoch← new_epoch;
151 initialized← true;
152 (txn, payload, vote, dec, phase) ←
(txn, payload, vote, dec, phase);
153 send CONNECT(epoch) to members \members[s0];
154 when received CONNECT(epoch) from pj
155 pre: status , reconfiguring ∧ pj < connections;
156 open(pj );
157 connections← connections ∪ {pj };
158 send CONNECT_ACK(epoch) to pj ;
159 when received CONNECT_ACK(epoch) from pj
160 pre: status , reconfiguring ∧ pj < connections;
161 open(pj );
162 connections← connections ∪ {pj };
163 function multiclose(P )
164 forall p ∈ P do
165 close(p);
166 connections← connections \ {p};
167 function retry(k)
168 pre: phase[k] = prepared;
169 forall s ∈ shards(txn[k]) do
170 send PREPARE(txn[k],⊥) to leader[s];
Figure 8: RDMA-based protocol at a process pi in a shard s0: reconfiguration.
